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SUPREME COURT 
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CLYDE E. HARVEY, 
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APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sued to foreclose a Uniform Real Estate 
Contraot as a note and mortgage. One of the defendant 
"mortgagors" purchased the property at Sheriff's sale 
and later deeded the property to respondent. Appellant 
joined respondent in a third-party action to have his deed 
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2 
declared null and void because of the prior recorded in-
terests of appellant in the property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon resondent's motion to dismiss the third-party 
complaint, prior to the filing of any answer or other plead-
ing or the taking of any evidence, the lower court con-
sidered the motion as one for summary judgment and 
granted summary judgment dismissing the third-party 
complaint with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the summary judgment dis-
missing their third^party complaint reversed requiring 
respondent to file an answer thus bringing the case to 
issue on the merits or, in the alternative, allowing appel-
lants to file an amended third-party complaint alleging 
actual notice to respondent of appellants' interest in the 
property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 1, 1959, Harold S. Armstrong and his wife 
executed a Uniform Real Etate Contract (hereinafter 
Contract "A") to sell certain property in Salt Lake 
County to Owen L. Sanders (R. 10-11). This contract 
was recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office 
on February 7,1964. Title to the property and the sellers' 
interest in Contract "A" was conveyed and assigned to 
Fred A. Newberger and his wife on January 31, 1968, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and further conveyed and assigned by the Newbergers 
to Clyde E. Harvey and his wife, the plaintiffs in this 
action, on March 4, 1968. The buyer's interest in Con-
tract "A" was assigned by Sanders to Beehive Invest-
ment Company on June 30, 1959. Beehive then entered 
into a separate Uniform Real Estate Contract (herein-
after Contract "B") to sell the same property, on differ-
ent terms, to Kenneth E. Coombs and Lynn H. Coombs, 
the third-party plaintiffs and appellants in this action, 
on February 28, 1962. Contract "B" was also recorded 
in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office on February 
7, 1964 (R. 47). Subsequently, on June 29, 1967, the 
buyer's interest in Contract "A" and the seller's interest 
in Contract "B" were assigned by Beehive to Intermoun-
tain Capital Corporation (R. 45-48, 65-68). 
There were other assignments and transactions con-
cerning this property not relevant to this appeal. The 
results of all of the above transactions left Harveys hold-
ing title to the property subject to Contract "A", by 
which Harveys were selling the property to Intermoun-
tain Capital Corporation, and further subject to Contract 
"B", by which Intermountain Capital Corporation was 
reselling the property to the Coombs. 
Intermountain failed to make the payments due un-
der Contract "A" and Harveys declared the balance owing 
to be due and payable, elected to treat the contract as 
a note and mortgage and sued to foreclose (R. 1-15). 
Intermountain and the Coombs, as well as others, were 
named as defendants. Intermountain filed a cross-corn 
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plaint against the Coombs alleging a default under Con-
tract "B" and praying for the court to adjudge Inter-
mountain "released from all obligations in law and equity 
to convey said property" to the Coombs, that all pay-
ments made by the Coombs be forfeited as liquidated 
damages for non-performance of the contract, and that, 
"if and upon plaintiffs herein being satisfied," Inter-
mountain "be permitted to re-enter and take possession 
of said premises" (R. 32). The Coombs filed an answer 
to the cross-complaint denying any default under Con-
tract "B", raising some affirmative defenses and claiming 
that Intermountain was "obligated to provide good title 
to the property to these defendants," had defaulted in 
its payments under Contract "A", which was therefore 
being foreclosed, and was therefore unable to provide good 
title to the property to these defendants (R. 34-36). 
On July 3, 1968, pursuant to plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, a Decree of Foreclosure was entered 
by which judgment for the balance due was entered 
against Intermountain and in favor of Harveys, Contract 
"A" was foreclosed as a mortgage, and the property or-
dered sold at Sheriff's sale to satisfy the judgment (R. 
59-63), The cross-complaint of Intermountain against 
the Coombs was not disposed of because it involved issues 
of fact which were in dispute. The decree provided, how-
ever, that the interest of the defendants, including the 
Coombs, not be barred and foreclosed until "after the 
expiration of the period of redemption as provided by 
law" (R. 61). 
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The Sheriff's sale was held on August 6, 1968, and 
the property was sold by the Sheriff to Intermountain, 
the defendant against whom the judgment was entered 
(R. 83). Since that time Intermountain has not taken 
any further action to have the court consider its claims 
set forth in its cross-complaint against the Coombs and 
those claims remain undisposed of by the court. In July 
of 1969 the Coomibs were informed that Intermountain 
did not recognize any obligation to the Coombs under 
Contract "B". Fearing that Intermountain might at-
tempt to dispose of the property without recognizing 
their interests, the Coombs caused a Notice of Lis Pen-
dens to be filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder, on 
July 30, 1969, giving notice of the pending cross-claims 
between Intermountain and the Coombs and of the in-
terest of the Coombs in the property (R. 98, 100). In 
spite of the recorded Notice of Lis Pendens, and in spite 
of the recorded Contract "B" between Intermountain 
and the Coombs (R. 47), Intermountain cnnveyed the 
property to A. Herman and Company, the third-party 
defendant herein, by a warranty deed bearing the date 
of July 14, 1969, but not recorded until August 7, 1969 
(R. 98, 101). 
Thereafter, on February 22, 1974, the Coombs, after 
motion and order by the court, filed a third-party com-
plaint against Albert W. Horman, d/b/a A. Herman and 
Company, alleging the above facts and thiat the cross-
claims between Intermountain and the Coombs had not 
been determined, and praying that Intermountain be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ordered to convey title to the property to the Coombs, 
upon determination and payment of the balance due un-
der Contract "B", and that the warranty deed to Herman 
be declared null and void (R. 97-102). Herman filed a 
motion to dismiss the third-party complaint claiming 
only that it "fails to state a claim on which relief can 
be granted." At the hearing on the motion to dismiss the 
lower court, on its own initiative, considered the motion 
as a motion for summary judgment and continued the 
hearing for two weeks, at which time the Coombs would 
be allowed to present additional matter pertinent to a 
motion for summary judgment (R. 121, 122). The 
Coombs' attorney strenuously objected to this procedure 
but filed an affidavit indicating that Intermountain had 
received and accepted substantial payments under Con-
tract "B" after the Sheriff's sale in August, 1968 and 
boitih prior and subsequent to the deed to Herman in 
1969 (R. 123). The court, nevertheless, entered summary 
judgment dismissing the third^party complaint with prej-
udice (R. 139). 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants contend that the lower court erred pro-
cedurally in dismissing the third-party complaint, in treat-
ing respondents' motion to dismiss as a motion for sum-
mary judgment, and in failing to allow appellants to 
amend their third-party complaint. Appellants further 
contend that the lower court ignored the substantive law 
as to the effect of prior recorded interests and the effect 
of purchase at a Sheriff's sale by the "mortgagor". 
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POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT'S TREATMENT OF 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WAS CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE BECAUSE NO INFORMA-
TION OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS WAS 
PRESENTED AND GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT REMAIN UNRESOLVED. 
Horman's motion to dismiss was grounded upon the 
sole contention that the third-party complaint "fails to 
state a claim on which relief can be granted." This mo-
tion assumes the truth of all allegations of fact in the 
third-party complaint and calls only for an examination 
of the complaint to determine if it states a cause of 
action. The motion should not be granted unless it ap-
pears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled 
to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of the claim. Christensen v. Lelis Automatic 
Transmission Service, Inc., 24 U. 2d 165, 467 P. 2d 605 
(1970). 
Rule 12 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does 
provide that on a motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, if "matters out-
side the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to pre-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sent all material made pertinent to such a motion by 
Rule 56." However, neither party presented any matters 
outside the pleading to the court. Yet, the court, on its 
own, told the third^party plaintiff to present its evidence 
within two weeks or a summary judgment would be 
granted! This was prior to the filing of an answer, prior 
to the raising of any issues and prior to any opportunity 
for discovery. This procedure would require a party to 
be completely ready for trial at the time he files his com-
plaint! 
This court has recently held this procedure to be 
reversible error. In Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 U. 2d 
121, 477 P. 2d 150 (1970), the plaintiff filed a complaint 
for libel alleging malice on the part of defendant. The 
defendant, without answering, moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. The court denied the motion but gave the 
plaintiff thirty days to produce evidence of malice and 
stated that, upon plaintiff's failure to do so, summary 
judgment would be granted. The plaintiff filed an affi-
davit and served interrogatories and the defendant filed 
a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by 
the court. On appeal this court reversed stating: 
" . . . we do not think it is proper for a court to 
require a plaintiff to state what proof he will 
produce on an issue which has not even been 
raised. 
"True it is that when a motion to dismiss 
is accompanied by affidavits it may be treated 
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as a motion for summary judgment, yet the 
court should not on his own initiative try to 
convert a motion for dismissal into one for sum-
mary judgment. H e has no more right to ask 
the plaintiff how he will establish his claim than 
he has to require the defendant to state what 
its defense will be. I t would have been highly 
improper for the court, on the motion to dis-
miss, to have given the defendant 30 days to 
present proof as to the truth of the alleged 
statement or as to the lack of malice. (Empha-
sis supplied.) 
• • • • 
"Summary judgment is never used to de-
termine what the facts are, but only to ascer-
tain whether there are any material issues of 
fact in dispute. If there be any such disputed 
issues of fact, they cannot be resolved by sum-
mary judgment even when the parties proper-
ly bring the motion before the court/' (Em-
phasis in original.) 
The holding in Hill should dispose of the case now 
before the court without further argument. I t could hard-
ly be more in point. Based upon the facts alleged in appel-
lants' third-party complaint, which must be accepted as 
true at this stage of the proceedings, the legal sufficiency 
of appellants' cause of action will be established in Points 
II and III. 
POINT II. 
THE PURCHASE AT THE SHERIFF'S SALE 
BY INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPO-
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RATION TERMINATED THE FORECLOS-
URE ACTION AND LEFT ALL PARTIES, 
EXCEPT THE "MORTGAGEE," WHERE 
THEY WERE PRIOR TO THE FORECLOS-
URE ACTION. THE CONTRACT OF IN-
TERMOUNTAIN TO CONVEY TITLE TO 
THE PROPERTY TO THE COOMBS IS 
THEREFORE STILL IN FORCE. 
When the Harveys sued to foreclose Contract "A" 
as a note and mortgage, the law with respect to fore-
closure of mortgages became applicable. The Harveys 
became the "mortgagees" and Intermountain became the 
"mortgagor" and the judgment debtor in the terms of 
the applicable statutes and rules. The Coombs, not being 
personally liable to the Harveys under Contract "A", but 
having a recorded interest and being a necessary party 
to the action, stood in the position of a second mortgagee 
or a judgment creditor. Section 78-37-1, U. C. A., pro-
vides that ". . . judgment shall be given . . . directing the 
sheriff to proceed and sell the (mortgaged property) 
according to the provisions of law relating to sales on 
execution . . ." Section 78-37-6, U. C. A., provides that 
"sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of 
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in cases 
of sales under executions generally." The provisions of 
Rule 69(e) and (f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are 
therefore applicable to the Sheriff's sale of the property 
involved in this proceeding. 
There is no provision in the rule which directly states 
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the effect of the purchase at the Sheriff's sale by the 
mortgagor. However, the only relevant provisions of the 
rule are as follows: 
Rule 69(e)(6) 
"Upon a sale of real property the officer shall 
give to the purchaser a certificate of sale, con-
taining: . . . (4) a statement to the effect that 
all right, title, interest and claim of the judg-
ment debtor in and to the property is conveyed 
to the purchaser . . . . The real property sold 
shall be subject to redemption " 
Rule 69(f) (5) 
". . . . If the judgment debtor redeems, the ef-
fect of the sale is terminated and lie is restored 
to his e s t a t e . . . . " 
Appellants have searched unsuccessfully for a case 
in the State of Utah dealing with the effect of a mortga-
gor's purchase at a Sheriff's sale. However, the case of 
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 U. 2d 84, 305 P. 2d 882 (1957), affd 
on rehearing, 6 U. 2d 268, 311 P. 2d 791 (1957), clearly 
states the effect of a redemption by a mortgagor. The 
court on rehearing stated: 
"Under the above provisions of Rule 69 (f) (5) 
had Reichert redeemed from the Sheriff's sale 
as a judgment debtor and as a successor of the 
interest of the Lawlers, the effect of the fore-
closure sale would have terminated. In that 
case he would have been the owner of the prop-
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12 
erty free from the mortgage which had been 
foreclosed and paid off by the sale and re-
demption, but the subsequent liens and other 
interests in the property, including the Clowes 
judgment lien, would have been restored the 
same as if no foreclosure sale had occurred, and 
the rights of subsequent redemptioners would 
have been terminated/' (Emphasis supplied.) 
In the Tanner case the mortgagee was the purchaser 
at the Sheriff's sale and the mortgagor deliberately did 
not redeem by paying his money to the Sheriff, as re-
quired by Rule 69 (f) (2), U. R. C. P. Instead he took 
an assignment of the certificate of sale from the mort-
gagee and paid a negotiated price therefor directly to 
the mortgagee. 
I t should be remembered that the "mortgagor," In-
termountain, did not redeem the property from the pur-
chaser at the Sheriff's sale. I t submitted the highest bid 
at the sale and therefore was the purchaser. No redemp-
tion, as such was involved. What then is the effect upon 
the foreclosure action and upon all other parties to the 
action claiming liens or interests in the property? Logic 
and fairness suggest that the effect should be the same 
as when the mortgagor or judgment debtor redeems, that 
is, "the sale is terminated and he is restored to his es-
tate," along with "the subsequent liens and other inter-
ests in the property . . . the same as if no foreclosure sale 
had occurred." Rule 69(f)(5) and Tanner v. Lawler, 
supra. Otherwise, a judgment debtor could bar the claims 
of all his creditors holding junior liens against his prop-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
erty by allowing the first mortgage-holder to foreclose and 
purchase the property at the Sheriff's sale. 
One searches almost in vain for cases which deal 
directly with this question — perhaps because the answer 
is so obvious and is rarely questioned. However, if one 
goes back far enough, the cases state the law to be ele-
mentary that the purchase at a mortgage foreclosure sale 
by the mortgagor or judgment debtor terminates the 
effect of the foreclosure and reinstates all subsequent 
liens and other interests in the property. One of the most 
recent cases dealing with the question is Gerken v. Dav-
idson Grocery Co., 50 Idaho 315, 296 Pac. 192 (1931). In 
that case Gerken took title to property and assumed three 
mortgages thereon. Later the second mortgage foreclosed 
and Gerken, the mortgagor, purchased the property at 
the foreclosure sale. Still later the third mortgage fore-
closed and purchased the property at the sale. Gerken's 
wife sued to quiet title against the third mortgagee claim-
ing that since the third mortgagee failed to redeem in 
the first foreclosure action, its rights were barred. The 
court held otherwise, stating: 
"After a foreclosure sale, subsequent 
equities are binding on the purchaser's title 
where the mortgagor himself becomes the pur-
chaser and the equities were placed there by 
himself. 42 C.J. 256 Par. 1905; Jones on 
Mortgages (8th Ed.) vol. 3, Par. 2429. Hav-
ing constructive notice of appellants' mortgage 
at the time he took the quitclaim deed, and not 
having contested the Davidson Grocery Com-
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pany's mortgage in its foreclosure, to which 
proceeding he was a party, Gerken could no 
more have evaded that subsequent equity than 
could his grantors; he could not keep the land 
and at the same time gainsay the burden. I n 
effect, all he had done was to clear the land of 
the Heiss mortgage; appellants' mortgage re-
mained unaffected." 
The Gerken case cited Landau v. Cottrill, 159 Mo. 
308, 60 S. W. 64 (1900), in which Cottrill took title sub-
ject to a trust deed and then purchased the property at 
a Sheriff's sale upon foreclosure of a mechanics lien. The 
court held the medianics Uen to be junior to the torust 
deed but stated that even if the mechanics hen had pri-
ority, purchase at the sale by Cottrill would not bar the 
trust deed. In Beitel v. Dobbin, 44 S. W. 299 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1898), one Hoefling took title to property subject 
to two mortgages. He purchased the property ait the 
Sheriff's sale upon foreclosure of the first mortgage. The 
sale was held to be invalid because it was held in the 
wrong county but the court stated: 
" I t is elementary that a purchaser of 
property, who agrees, as a part of the consid-
eration, to pay off two mortgages upon it, can-
not suffer a sale to take place under the prior 
one, and, without discharging the junior mort-
gage, claim title against it. Jones, Mortg. § 
740; Buke v. Abbott, (Ind. Sup.) 1 N.E . 485; 
Conner v. How, (Minn.) 29 N.W. 316; Alii-
son v. Armstrong, 9 N.W. 806; Mawfield v. 
Willey, (Mich.) 9 N.W. 271. Under this prin-
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ciple, Hoefling could not, were the sale under 
the deed of trust valid, avoid his agreement to 
discharge appellants' mortgage." 
There are numerous cases which hold that the reac-
quisition of title by a mortgagor, after foreclosure of a 
first mortgage, inures to the benefit of junior mortgage-
holders whether the property is purchased by the mort-
gagor at the foreclosure sale or later acquired by the 
mortgagor from the purchaser at the sale. See Annota-
tion, Reacquisition by mortgagor, or his grantee, of the 
title through foreclosure of first mortgage as affecting 
rights under a second mortgage to which the property 
was subject before the foreclosure, 111 A. L. R. 1285. Some 
of these cases are based upon estoppel, some are based 
upon covenants in the mortgage against encumbrances, 
and some are based upon statutes providing that title 
acquired after the execution of the mortgage inures to 
the benefit of the mortgagee. 
All three of these grounds exist in the instant case. 
Fairness and equity require that a mortgagor not be 
allowed to avoid his obligation to junior lien-holders by 
purchasing at the foreclosure sale. Contract "B" contains 
covenants by Intermountain against encumbrances and 
guarantees the delivery of good title. By the terms of 
Contract "B" Intermountain was obligated to buy at the 
Sheriff's sale, or redeem, to protect the title which it had 
agreed to convey to the Coombs (R. 12-13, Par. 19). And 
Utah has an after-acquired title statute, § 57-1-10, U. C. A., 
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which applies to "every instrument in writing by which 
any real estate, or interest in real estate, is created, 
aliened, mortgaged, encumbered, or assigned . . . " § 57-
1-1, U. C. A. This language certainly covers Contract "B" 
and therefore, by statute, the acquisition of title to the 
property by Intermountain at the foreclosure sale inures 
to the benefit of the Coombs. 
One further reason exists for appellants' contention. 
If the interests of the Coombs were not reinstated by 
Intermountain's purchase at the Sheriff's sale, they would 
be barred absolutely except for redemption rights. In 
order to redeem from Intermountain the Coombs would 
have been required to pay the amount owed by Inter-
mountain to the Harveys, plus interest, costs and attor-
neys fees, plus the entire amount due from the Coombs 
to Intermountain under Contract "B", Rule 69(f) (3), 
U. R. C. P., even though it was not yet payable under 
the terms of Contract "B" and even though the amount 
payable is in dispute since it is the subject of the cross-
complaint filed by Intermountain (R. 31). The Coombs 
would thereby be forced to give up their claims, which 
are properly in litigation, and forego the payment sched-
ule in Contract "B", and immediately pay any amount 
demanded by Intermountain. That is why the law pro-
vides for termination of the foreclosure upon redemption, 
or direct purchase, by the debtor, thereby terminating 
the redemption rights of others. Redemption by the 
mortgagor, or purchase at the sale directly by the mort-
gagor, places all of these parties back where they were. 
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The only change is that the foreclosed senior mortgage 
has been satisfied by payment at the sale. 
POINT III. 
HORMAN TOOK TITLE TO THE PROPER-
TY SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF ALL 
PARTIES WITH RECORDED INTERESTS. 
THE RECORDED CONTRACT "B" AND 
THE RECORDED LIS PENDENS BOTH 
GAVE NOTICE TO HORMAN OF THE IN-
TEREST OF THE COOMBS. 
The contract between Intermountain and the 
Coombs, Contract "B", was recorded in the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office on February 7, 1964 (R. 47). 
The deed from Intermountain to Herman was not re-
corded until August 7, 1969 (R. 98, 101). The law as to 
priority of recorded documents is therefore applicable 
here. Section 57-1-6, U. C. A., provides: 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and 
every instrument of writing setting forth an 
agreement to convey any real estate or whereby 
any real estate may be affected, to operate as 
notice to third persons shall be . . . recorded 
in the office of the recorder of the county in 
which such real estate is situated, but shall be 
valid and binding between the parties thereto 
without such . . . record, and as to all other 
persons who have had actual notice . . . ." 
Section 57-3-2, U. C. A., provides: 
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"Every conveyance, or instrument in writ-
ing affecting real estate . . . shall, from the 
time of filing the same with the recorder for 
record, impart notice to all persons of the con-
tents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, 
mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to 
purchase and take with notice." 
And Section 57-3-3, U. C. A., provides: 
"Every conveyance of real estate here-
after made, which shall not be recorded as pro-
vided in this title, shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration of the same real estate, 
or any portion thereof, where his own convey-
ance shall be first duly recorded." 
That a recorded notice of contract (the contract 
itself was not recorded) takes priority over a subsequently 
recorded deed is the holding of the recent case of Wilson 
v. Schneitefs Riverside Golf Course, U. 2d , 523 
P. 2d 1226 (1974). There, two contracts contained over-
lapping descriptions. The first contract was not recorded 
but a notice of the later contract was recorded prior to 
the deed given pursuant to the first contract. The court 
stated: 
"Plaintiffs having recorded their notice of 
purchase prior to the recording of the de-
fendant's deed the defendant becomes the sub-
sequent purchaser and is deemed to take with 
notice of the plaintiffs' interest." 
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Under these authorities Horman, in the instant case, 
clearly had notice of the Coombs' interest in the property 
and took his deed subject to their interest. Furthermore, 
the notice of lis pendens was recorded on July 30, 1969, 
eight days prior to the recording of Horman's deed. The 
notice of lis pendens was recorded, not because it was 
required to be recorded under the statutes, but because 
it was feared that someone might overlook the recorded 
Contract "B" because of the foreclosure of Contract "A" 
and not understand the effect of the purchase at the 
Sheriff's sale by Intermountain, as set forth in Pbint I I 
above. That notice of lis pendens expressly referred to 
the pending cross-claims between Intermountain and the 
Coombs and stated that the interest of the Coombs "in 
said property were reinstated by the purchase of said 
property at Sheriff's sale by Intermountain Capital Cor-
poration of Utah" (R. 100). 
Such a notice cannot be ignored by Horman, or any 
other party dealing with the property. In Crompton v. 
Jenson, 78 Utah 55,1 P. 2d 242 (1931), it is stated that: 
"One who deals with real property is charged 
with notice of what is shown by the records of 
the county recorder of the county in which the 
property is situated." 
The doctrine of lis pendens is a common law concept 
providing that ". . . whoever purchases or acquires an 
interest in property that is involved in pending litigation 
stands in the same position as his vendor, is charged with 
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notice of the rights of his vendor's antagonist, and takes 
the property subject to whatever judgment may be ren-
dered in the litigation. In other words, a person who 
deals with property while it is in litigation does so at 
his peril." 51 Am. Jur. 2d Lis Pendens § 1. Most states, 
including Utah, have enacted statutes providing for the 
filing of a notice of pendency of an action, since at com-
mon law the filing of a notice was not required. The 
Utah statute is found in § 78-40-2, U. C. A.: 
"If (sic) any action affecting the title to, 
or the right of possession of real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or 
thereafter, and the defendant at the time of 
filing his answer when affirmative relief is 
claimed in such answer, or at any time after-
wardy may file for record with the recorder of 
the county in which the property or some part 
thereof is situated a notice of the pendency of 
the action, containing the names of the parties, 
the object of the action or defense, and a de-
scription of the property in that county af-
fected thereby. From the time of filing such 
notice for record only shall a purchaser or en-
cumbrancer of the property affected thereby 
be deemed to have constructive notice of the 
pendency of the action, and only of its 
pendency against parties designated by their 
real names." (Emphasis supplied) 
This doctrine, as it prevails in the State of Utah, has 
been further explained in Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley loan 
& Trust Co., 20 Utah 103, 57 Pac. 845, 847 (1899), which 
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holds that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale must take 
notice of the terms of the decree pursuant to which the 
sale occurs. The court stated: 
"When the foreclosure suit was com-
menced a lis pendens was filed. The defendants 
and their attorneys knew of and had actual 
notice of the pendency of the action, and the 
subsequent rendition of the decree, and that 
the mortgage lien was still upon the land. The 
object of lis pendens is to keep the subject of 
the suit, or res, within the power and control 
of the court until the judgment or decree shall 
be entered so that courts can give effect to their 
judgments, and that the public shall have notice 
of the pendency of the action. Lis pendens may 
be defined to be the jurisditcion, power, or 
control which courts acquire over property in-
volved in a suit pending the continuance of 
the action, and until its final judgment therein. 
This constructive notice of filing the com-
plaint as required by the statute is equivalent 
to actual notice." 
These authorities should make it clear that Horman 
took his deed subject to the interest of the Coombs, notice 
of which was on file in the County Recorder's office prior 
to the recording of his deed. The fact that Horman's 
deed bears the date of July 14, 1969, a date prior to the 
recording of the lis pendens, does not change the situa-
tion. The recording statutes quoted above are designed 
to give priority to the party who first records his docu-
ment and make a prior unrecorded conveyance void as 
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to innocent third parties who first record their own docu-
ment. See § 57-3-3, U. C. A., supra, and Wilson v. Schnei-
tefs Riversidle Golf Course, supra, where the earlier un-
recorded contract was void as to the buyer under a later 
contract, notice of which was recorded prior to the record-
ing of the deed given pursuant to the earlier contract. 
There is also substantial other authority for the rule that 
deeds and instruments made prior to a notice of lis pen-
dens, but not recorded until after the notice of lis pen-
dens, are subject to the notice of lis pendens. Jones v. 
Jones, 249 Miss. 322, 161 So. 2d 640 (1964); Munger v. 
Beard, 79 Neb. 764, 113 N. W. 214 (1907), upholding 
constitutionality of a statute imposing effects of lis pen-
dens on persons holding unrecorded interests; Colling-
wood v. Brown, 106 N. C. 362,10 S, E. 868 (1890), which 
holds an unrecorded interest subject to a suit even though 
no notice of lis pendens was filed as required by statute 
because "all persons are supposed to be attentive to 
what passes in courts of justice" in the county where 
the property is situated. That court further stated that 
if "owners will omit to record their deeds, and will keep 
their titles concealed, hoping thereby to bring others into 
difficulty and peril, it is time they were made to under-
stand that the blow intended for the title of another may 
recoil upon, and break and destroy, their own." 
The recorded Contract "B" and the recorded lis 
pendens both adequately notified Horman of the interest 
and claims of the Coombs. True, those claims are in liti-
gation, having been placed in litigation by Herman's 
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grantor, Intermountain. But the Coombs deserve to have 
those claims adjudicated before their interest in the prop-
erty is defeated. Their third-party complaint seeks only 
to join Horman as a party and make his deed to the 
property subject to the decree of the court as to the mer-
its of the claims between Intermountain and the Coombs. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISS-
ING THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
W I T H PREJUDICE. A P P E L L A N T S 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO 
AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE 
ACTUAL NOTICE TO HORMAN OF THE 
I N T E R E S T A N D C L A I M S OF THE 
COOMBS. 
No opportunity was afforded to appellants to amend 
the third-party complaint, as is the usual practice. The 
lower court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Ap-
pellants contend that the complaint was sufficient as it 
stands, and rely fully upon their contentions under Points 
I, II & III, above, but, at the very least, an amendment 
should have been permitted to allege the actual knowl-
edge of Horman of the interest and claims of the Coombs. 
The statutes and cases cited above make the cons>tructive 
notice of the recorded Contract "B" and the recorded 
lis pendens sufficient to subject Horman's deed to the 
Coombs' interest. However, there is additional authority 
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which requires a party with actual notice of an adverse 
claim to take subject to that claim. 
Section 57-1-6, U. C. A., supra, expressly makes an 
instrument affecting real estate binding upon "persons 
who have had actual notice," and § 57-3-3, U. C. A., supra, 
invalidates prior unrecorded interests only as against sub-
sequent purchasers "in good faith." In Whittaker v. 
Greenwood, 17 Utah 33, 53 Pac. 736 (1898), the plaintiff 
contended that he was not bound by a decree in a previ-
ous action because no notice of lis pendens was filed. The 
court held otherwise and stated that under the lis pen-
dens statute: 
". . . notice of lis pendens may be filed with the 
county recorder. The object of this statute 
was to provide a mode for giving constructive 
notice which was formerly given by the com-
mencement of the action itself. I t does not in 
any way change the rule of law relating to 
actual notice of the pendency of the action, nor 
the effect of such actual notice upon parties 
dealing with or obtaining possession or title 
to the land in litigation. In this case it appears 
that . . . plaintiff . . . had actual notice, and 
was not in a position to object if the statutory 
notice had not been filed, the filing of which 
was intended only to give him the notice which 
he had already or afterwards acquired before 
purchase." 
The position of this court in the Whittaker case was 
reaffirmed in Meagher v. Equity Oil Company, 5 U. 2d 
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196, 299 P. 2d 827 (1956). That a purchaser of land takes 
title subject to the claims of others of which he has notice 
was also the holding of National Realty Sales v. Ewing, 
55 Utah 438,186 Pac. 1103 (1920), where the court stated: 
" . . . a subsequent purchaser cannot be pro-
tected as a bona fide purchaser if he had actual 
or constructive notice of an unrecorded title, 
ownership, or interest in the property at any 
time before payment of the purchase price." 
In addition the case of Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley 
Loan & Trust Co., supra, relied upon the actual knowl-
edge of the defendants as well as the constructive notice 
of a Us pendens in holding the defendants' title subject 
to the plaintiff's claim. 
While the constructive notice of the recorded docu-
ments should be sufficient to subject Horman's deed to 
the interest of the Coombs, the Coombs should be al-
lowed to plead and prove the actual knowledge of Hor-
man which deprives him of "good faith" purchaser status. 
The law is clear that he is subject to all claims of which 
he has actual notice. 
CONCLUSION 
It should be clear from the statutes, cases and other 
authorities cited above that the lower court erred in en-
tering summary judgment against the Coombs. The 
court's demand for proof, "or else," before an answer is 
filed and any issues raised was improper procedure under 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The lower court fur-
ther overlooked the law which provides that the purchase 
at Sheriff's sale by the mortgagor reinstates the claims 
and interests of all junior lien-holders. The lower court 
further overlooked the statutes and cases granting prior-
ity to recorded interests over those whose interests are 
later recorded and subjecting property purchasers to the 
interests of those whose claims are in litigation when 
notice thereof, either constructive or actual, has been 
given. 
Therefore, this court should reverse the summary 
judgment entered below and order that the deed to Hor-
man be subjected to the outcome of the pending litiga-
tion between Intermountain and the Coombs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorney for Appellants 
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